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Many industries have recently experienced rapid 
changes in the economic environment coupled with 
increasing reaction times of competition and higher 
expectations from customers. Today’s business lead-
ers must constantly review and develop their organi-
zations capabilities, value creation processes, market 
strategies, relationship networks and so on. There have 
been at least two approaches in the literature to explain 
the ability of organisations to adapt to and benefit from 
such external changes, the business model concept 
(Timmers, 1998; Osterwalder – Pigneur, 2002) and 
the dynamic capabilities approach (Teece et al., 1997; 
Eisenhardt – Martin, 2000; Zahra – George, 2002). 
A business model is a tool to help understand how an or-
ganisation does business (Magretta, 2002; Zott – Amit, 
2010). It is concerned with how it sets competitive 
strategy through the design of its products, how prices 
are set, what it costs to produce, how it differentiates 
itself by the value proposition, and how it integrates 
its own value chain in to those of other members of the 
value network (Teece, 2010).
Dynamic capabilities can be defined as the capac-
ity of an organization to purposefully create, extend, or 
modify its resource base (Helfat et al., 2007: p. 4.). This 
enables it to exploit business, technological and market 
opportunities and adapt to market changes (Teece et al., 
1997; Teece, 2010).
Some business organisations are able to adapt to 
rapid external changes and maximize new opportunities 
while managing potential or actual loss of established 
markets again and again, while others are going out of 
business. Are there significant differences between the 
business models of such companies, or is the deciding 
factor not the business model in itself, but the ability to 
adopt, change, and manage the tensions created from a 
state of constant transitions, regardless of the business 
model applied. This article contributes to this discus-
sion by arguing that an organisation’s dynamic capa-
bilities improve the firm’s performance in a state of 
turbulence, and that such capabilities also support the 
process of adopting the business model. Leaders who 
are able to ‘hard wire’ such abilities into their leader-
ship teams ensure a constant evolution of their business 
model. Using the case study method, we will analyse 
the dynamic capabilities of an organisation in greater 
detail to advance our understanding of this concept. We 
will also discuss which are some of the specific capa-
bilities to successfully changing a business model, fol-
lowing the call for more investigation into the ‘black 
box’ of business model activities (Zott – Amit, 2010).
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There is an abundance of literature on business 
models (Timmers, 1998; Amit – Zott, 2001; Tapscott, 
2001; Stähler, 2002) as well as some studies, which 
discuss model change, especially the model design 
process (Zott – Amit, 2007; Zott – Amit, 2008; Zott 
– Amit, 2010; Frankenberger – Weiblen et al., 2013). 
At the same time there is still uncharted territory in 
this field, for example there is limited understanding of 
what enables the change itself (e.g., Lindner – Cantrell, 
2000) or how flexible a model needs to be to survive 
in the long term (e.g., Chesbrough, 2007). Only few 
complex models, which permit the presence of strate-
gic tensions, have been classified and defined by schol-
ars (Smith et al., 2010). For example Achtenhagen et 
al. (2013) identify capabilities inherent in companies 
successfully changing business models, which relates 
to the concept of ‘dynamic capabilities’.
The literature on dynamic capabilities focuses not 
only on the ability and the process of changing models, 
but the inherent capabilities to adapt to changes, ex-
ploit new opportunities and switch assets and organisa-
tional structures. When present, such capabilities allow 
shifting business models as well as other tangible and 
intangible assets of the firm creating a competitive ad-
vantage. The concept was initially advanced by Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen (1997) and has attracted much atten-
tion in the strategic management literature (Eisenhardt 
– Martin, 2000; Zollo – Winter, 2002; Di Stefano et al., 
2010). This article follows calls to investigate such dy-
namic capabilities in greater detail, including extend-
ing the knowledge of their dynamic nature, analysing 
their nature in traditional, less dynamic industries, and 
understanding how leaders and their teams interact to 
create such capabilities (Easterby-Smith et al., 2009; 
Kor – Mesko, 2013).
We argue that there are some capabilities, which 
leaders can develop without the need to change busi-
ness models, and illustrate such capabilities based on 
data collected. Furthermore, there are also complex 
business models, which encourage the development 
and application of such capabilities. These include in-
herent conflicts, paradoxes, and therefore encourage an 
organisation to live with, manage and benefit from a 
constant tension to justify one against the other, com-
pare, chose. Paradox is some ‘thing’ constructed by 
persons or organisations when oppositional tendencies 
are brought into proximity through reflection or inter-
action (Ford – Backoff, 1988). The strategies would be 
paradoxical if multiple strategies were ‘contradictory, 
yet interrelated’ (Lewis, 2000). For example leaders 
may demand from a production unit to deliver speedy, 
low cost service to one customer segment while achiev-
ing slower, high quality service to another, with success 
metrics of a higher order, such as overall profitability. 
At the same time they need to ensure the company’s 
DNA encourages learning, manages conflict resolu-
tion, and gives equal opportunities to those delivering 
new opportunities and those maximizing profits out of 
existing businesses.
Research aim and methodology
The aim of the study reported in this paper was to 
answer the following research questions:
1. Which dynamic capabilities are required to re-
cover quickly from a significant drop in demand?
2. How to differentiate between changes to the dy-
namic capabilities and change models?
3. What specific dynamic capabilities allow main-
taining strategic paradox over a prolonged pe-
riod of time?
The research methodology selected is the case study 
method, a scientific and appropriate way to investigate 
phenomena in its context, “especially when the bound-
aries between phenomenon and contact are not clearly 
evident” (Yin, 1994: p. 13.). In this research, a single 
case study was employed in order to identify potential 
new facets of dynamic capabilities and business model 
change phenomena. Its results may therefore not be 
widely applicable, but still unearth new phenomena 
and help develop a relatively young research stream 
(Teece et al., 1997; Chesbrough, 2007; Smith et al., 
2010). Qualitative data collection took place by com-
pleting several in-depth interviews and content analysis 
of publicly accessible sources.
Theoretical background
Changing business models
Business model research has developed since the 
1980s to understand organisations’ strategic frame-
work and the identify frameworks which can help to 
deliver better economic outcomes. It has been argued 
that business models are rather vague descriptions of 
how a business should look like in order to be success-
ful (Stähler, 2002). We therefore start by definition how 
we will use the term business model. The creation of 
value for customers is at the heart of many definitions, 
and was introduced to the literature through Porter’s 
value chain concept (Porter, 1985) – in fact a first at-
tempt at describing business models. Later a business 
model describes the “core architecture of a firm, specif-
ically how it deploys all relevant resources” (Tapscott, 
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2001), the “content structure and governance of trans-
actions designed so as to create value” (Amit – Zott, 
2001). Other definitions stress that also the various ac-
tors and their roles, as well as how they benefit from 
the activities of the firm should be part of a business 
model (Timmers, 1998). Understanding the firm as part 
of a value creation network, and focusing on the ability 
of the organisation to convert value to customers into 
revenues is key to our analysis. Therefore we will re-
fer to the term business model as “a description of the 
value a company offers to one or several segments of 
customers and the architecture of the firm and its net-
work of partners for creating, marketing and delivering 
this value and relationship capital, in order to generate 
profitable and sustainable revenue streams” (Osterwal-
der – Pigneur, 2002).
The business model is also not to be mixed up with 
strategy. For the purposes of this paper, we prefer a 
definition of strategy, which allows the discussion of 
events in the past and present. In a backward look-
ing context, therefore, we view strategy as a pattern 
of choices made over time, and a plan, which can be 
identified behind these conscious choices by the firm 
(Mintzberg, 1994; Teece, 2010). Business models, in 
turn, should enable the firm to make such choices, and 
develop this plan, and therefore even in cases of drastic 
change of strategy stay in place. It is therefore impor-
tant to understand when a firm is undergoing a change 
of business model or a change of strategy.
Business models have six basic functions:
1. Articulate the value proposition, that is, the val-
ue created for users by the offering.
2. Identify a market segment, that is, the users to 
whom the offering is useful and for what pur-
pose.
3. Define the structure of the value chain required 
by the firm to create and distribute the offering, 
and determine the complementary assets needed 
to support the firm’s position in this chain. This 
includes the firm’s suppliers and customers, and 
should extend from raw materials to the final 
customer.
4. Specify the revenue generation mechanism(s) 
for the firm, and estimate the cost structure and 
profit potential of producing the offering, given 
the value proposition and value chain structure 
chosen.
5. Describe the position of the firm within the value 
network (also referred to as an ecosystem) link-
ing suppliers and customers, including identifica-
tion of potential complementors and competitors.
6. Formulate the competitive strategy by which the 
innovating firm will gain and hold advantage 
over rivals)” (Chesbrough, 2007).
It can be argued that companies in fast changing 
industries may change their model so rapidly, that the 
ability and processes to induce and manage the change 
require an established business model in itself. Follow-
ing the above definition by Osterwalder and Pigneur 
(2002) a company employing different processes with 
a new architecture or partner relationship to deliver 
value to segments of the market would be an evolu-
tion of the existing business model, not a new one. 
A simple change of a success metric would be purely 
a sideways shift of the model (McGrath, 2010). Con-
cepts that allow evolving from a specific state of their 
business model to a new and improved state have also 
been termed ‘change models’ by Linder and Cantrell 
(2000). Change that does not alter the fundamental mo-
dus operandi, e.g., a geographical expansion, is based 
on a ‘realization model’. An established process to con-
stantly change, such as companies regularly acquiring 
and improving additional brands was termed renewal 
model. Firms continuously expanding into new ground 
with opening new markets, adding new elements to the 
value change, or adding new operations without los-
ing any of the existing ones need an ‘extension model’. 
And ‘journey models’ are applied by companies delib-
erately leaving their status quo behind and embarking 
on a path towards a new business model. This could 
be a regional player developing into a global entity, in-
cluding establishing presence in many countries, and 
shifting their value proposition to include an increas-
ingly global reach and capabilities (Lindner – Cantrell, 
2000). This taxonomy is helpful to determine if changes 
require adjusting the business model itself, and to what 
extent. Also the presence of such a model in a company 
may determine the success of the change process.
Dynamic capabilities of a firm
Frequent changes in the business environment or 
new market opportunities with less time to act require 
companies to constantly renew their ability to react. The 
organisation’s capabilities and resources, its value crea-
tion processes, it’s product and service offering and rev-
enue generating capabilities, to name only a few, need 
to be shaped to be able to adopt quickly and effectively. 
This is most needed in uncertain trading environments, 
where companies need to enrich and reconfigure their 
capabilities as well as develop new ones (Sirmon et al., 
2008). Such capabilities have been discussed in the busi-
ness model literature, which agrees that models need to 
change as the company reacts to changes in their envi-
vezetestudomany 2015 11 beliv.indb   27 2015.11.11.   13:04:51
VEZETÉSTUDOMÁNY
XLVI. ÉVF. 2015. 11. SZÁM / ISSN 0133-017928
STUDIES AND ARTICLES
ronment or exploits new opportunities (Hamel, 2000; 
Lindner – Cantrell, 2000). The strategic management 
literature terms these “Dynamic capabilities”, which in-
clude all capabilities and organisational and managerial 
processes with which a firm exploits business, techno-
logical and market opportunities and shifts its assets and 
organizational structures adapting to market changes 
and company growth  (Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2010).
The objects of adoption are the assets and organi-
zational structures. The business model of an organisa-
tion can be regarded as asset in itself, and the capability 
of creating value, the structure of the value chain as 
well as revenue generating mechanisms are arguably 
among the most important assets of a firm. Dynamic 
capabilities are, in fact, the ability to design and evolve 
business models, rather than the business model itself. 
Following the definition above, changing business 
models may cause additional burden on the organisa-
tion to manage change, and therefore it would be ben-
eficial for a company to have resources and capabilities 
to adjust, but at the same time to have a business model 
that may not need to be changed each time a new op-
portunity arises. Such capabilities depend on the firm’s 
ability to constantly review and improve the relation-
ships and loops between the variables inside a business 
model (Casadesus-Masanell – Ricart, 2010).
Achtenhagen et al. identify what is needed for ability 
to change business models after completing a longitudi-
nal study of 25 SME firms (Achtenhagen et al., 2013). 
The first critical capability is an entrepreneurial orien-
tation towards experimenting with and exploiting new 
business opportunities. Such companies continuously 
obtain information about trends, markets and competi-
tors through market research, informal and secondary 
sources. They encourage the development of new ideas 
and provide freedom for the development of new busi-
ness ideas. While may lead also to mistakes, the culture 
handles this as an opportunity to learn from them. Sec-
ondly, Resources and capabilities are used in a balanced 
way. Although focusing on new opportunities, the ex-
isting business needs are not neglected. Also develop-
ment is spread over several resource bases. Financially, 
the company focuses on a steady cash flow, low cost 
levels and is ready to reinvest profits for further expan-
sion. The third ability is to achieve an active and clear 
leadership, a strong corporate culture and employee 
commitment. This includes encouraging employees’ 
contribution to ideas and constructive questioning. The 
company’s values are developed jointly, and clearly 
communicated. A visible and credible leadership style 
is being practiced and employees are involved in strate-
gizing activities (Achtenhagen et al., 2013).
Managing strategic paradoxes
In some cases attracting new segments requires new 
processes, or marketing mix elements, which put exist-
ing segments at risk. This would be the case when de-
livering value presently requires architecture and pro-
cesses that are unable to deliver value to new segments. 
When the strategies applied are seemingly contradic-
tory to each other, such as applying a low-cost strategy 
and a high value strategy in parallel, they are termed 
paradoxical strategies. Strategy refers to a set of prod-
ucts or services and how they are taken to market in 
order to compete. Paradox is some ‘thing’ constructed 
by persons or organisations when oppositional tenden-
cies are brought into proximity through reflection or in-
teraction (Ford – Backoff, 1988). The strategies would 
beparadoxical if multiple strategies were ‘contradic-
tory, yet interrelated’(Lewis, 2000). The strategies can 
involve inconsistent or contradictory use of products, 
markets, technology or other resources, which reinforce 
each other and lead to long-term organisational success. 
Companies successfully managing such situations are 
able to apply different strategies to different segments, 
and excel under such tensions. It is therefore important 
to understand more about such complex business mod-
els, as they are more critical in highly competitive, fast 
moving industries (Smithet al., 2010).
The concept of seemingly conflicting strategies has 
been illustrated by Williamson (2010) who presents the 
strategies by a company under pressure from competi-
tors to provide innovation at low cost. Although an es-
tablished player, it is faced with the challenge to deliver 
high technology at low cost, and variety and customi-
zation without a significant price premium, and at the 
same time over low prices to move into mass markets. 
Such cost innovative strategies had been displayed by 
new market entrants from countries such as China and 
India and became a threat to be taken seriously. The 
disruptive potential of such cost innovation called for 
some radical re-thinking about future business models. 
Achieving this required to rethink the supply chain, 
transfer value-for-money production to emerging 
economies and restructure reporting lines and improve 
know how of local staff to turn in to a truly global or-
ganization (Williamson, 2010). The challenge in such 
situations is that organisations may have become com-
placent, and unable to step out of their circle of think-
ing. Paradox itself has a power to generate insight and 
change, and is therefore an important contribution to 
management thinking (Eisenhardt – Westcott, 1988).
Marianne Lewis reviewed paradox identified in or-
ganisation studies, and proposed that the phenomena 
identified belong to one of three groups: Paradoxes of 
vezetestudomany 2015 11 beliv.indb   28 2015.11.11.   13:04:51
VEZETÉSTUDOMÁNY
XLVI. ÉVF. 2015. 11. SZÁM / ISSN 0133-0179 29
STUDIES AND ARTICLES
learning, organizing and belonging. Learning paradox-
es take place when past understandings are critiqued, 
questioned, and sometimes dismissed while allowing 
innovation, developing new concepts and constructing 
new and more complex frames of reference. The abil-
ity to transform the tensions between old and new of-
ten is called to action by shock as well as the ability to 
openly communicate and enforce the following internal 
battles in order to advance the organisation. Paradoxes 
of organizing discuss the balance between control and 
flexibility. Firms need to control yet encourage oppos-
ing forces to engage in conflict, avoiding both extreme 
chaos and rigidity, and ensure that superior ideas are 
being advanced (empowerment). Tools for this include 
agreement on superordinate goals and humour. Lastly, 
paradoxes of belonging relate to the ability of groups 
to value the diversity of their members and opinions, as 
well as the interconnections with other groups. It sets a 
framework, which allows members to focus on the tasks 
at hand with low power discrepancies within the group, 
valuing differences. It avoids tribalism or destructive 
conflict between groups, which has become an essential 
capability in the age of globalisation (Lewis, 2000).
Managing such tensions requires an influential lead-
er capable of thinking paradoxically, guiding a regular 
reflection within and among groups and help the organ-
isation to examine and not suppress tensions (Lewis, 
2000).
Case study and analysis
Situation/Challenge
The company selected for the 
case study is an airport confront-
ed with the bankruptcy of their 
largest airline customer. With 
around half of the total revenues 
lost over night, the financial sta-
bility of the firm was at stake, 
and the leadership team had to 
transform the company to return 
to a stable growth path. The case 
is well documented in the scien-
tific literature (Linkweiler, 2013; 
Bilotkach et al., 2014), however 
additional publicly available 
company and industry data as 
well as management interviews 
were used to allow deep insights. 
What makes this case unique is 
the fact that the company was 
able to react quickly, compensate 
the lost business, and fully recover (Linkweiler, 2013) 
while most other airports – there are at least 37 similar 
cases documented (Redondi et al., 2012) – fail to recov-
er within the first years.
The company
Budapest Airport Zrt. is the operator of Ferenc Liszt 
International Airport in Hungary under a long-term 
concession agreement and owned by a private consor-
tium. The airport was acquired from the state in De-
cember 2005, when 75% of the company was sold at 
a price tag of 1.8bn EUR, the biggest privatisation in 
Hungary’s history (hvg.hu, 2005; hvg.hu, 2006). Later, 
the remaining 25% were also sold making it a fully 
privately owned company, managed by the majority 
shareholder, the German AviAlliance GmbH (Budapest 
Airport, 2009). By 2011, the airport opened its Sky-
Court shopping centre located in the main departure 
hall, and fulfilled its commitment to invest into this and 
other modern infrastructure (Budapest Airport, 2011). 
The building won several architectural awards, and 
featured 39 catering and retail outlets will offer their 
services on 4300 square meters, including the largest 
unit, a 1400 square meter walk-through duty free shop 
operated by the German company Heinemann (ACI 
Europe, 2011). The Figure1 shows the airport’s pas-
senger volume (2014: forecasted) and the square me-
ters of retail space available.
Figure 1
Total in-terminal retail space and total passenger numbers
at Budapest Airport
(End-of-year data, 2014: forecasted). 
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In February 2011, the airport lost its main customer, 
Malév Hungarian Airlines, which stopped operations 
after it found itself unable to comply with a EU Com-
mission ruling to pay back illegal state aid. With Malév 
delivering almost half of the company’s revenues, this 
situation put the investment of 1.8bn EUR at risk, and 
sent a shockwave through the organisation. For com-
parison, the company’s finance cost was 112m EUR 
at the end of 2011 with revenues of 291m EUR. This 
heavy burden required fast and, in some cases, seem-
ingly contradictory strategic decisions by the manage-
ment, in order to ensure the company’s stability and 
satisfy investors’ expectations for the remaining 74 
years of this concession. (Table 1)
The company’s main revenue 
sources are fees paid by airlines and 
passengers, so aeronautical revenues, 
and income from ‘other’ activities 
including the operation of car parks, 
renting real estate and retail space, the 
non-aeronautical revenues. In 2011, 
Malév carried 3 million passengers, 
34% of the total, including 1.5 mil-
lion transfer passengers (portfolio.hu, 
2012). In addition, several partner air-
lines announced not to serve the airport 
any further, since their passengers lost 
the possibility to transfer on to Malév 
flights. In total, over 40% of the aero-
nautical revenue was at stake. The air-
port’s non-aeronautical revenues, ac-
counting for 33% of the business, were 
also under threat. The company had 
lease agreements with shops and cater-
ing units in both of its terminals, 1 and 
2, however Terminal 2, host to Malév, 
suddenly had less than half the passen-
gers, while terminal 1 was overcrowd-
ed. Both empty and crowded shops are 
a major concern and concessionaires 
were demanding correcting action. The 
company also rented a number of buildings to Malév, 
including office buildings, a crew centre, a flight train-
ing centre and so on.
The company had to move quickly to reduce cost 
burdens, maximize income from its existing customers, 
as well as backfill the massive gap in both aeronautical 
and non-aeronautical revenues. The actions turned into 
a success story. One year after the collapse, the airport 
had lost only 5% of passengers, which its shareholders 
praised as a “considerable achievement” (Linkweiler 
2013). The airport’s financial statements showed that 
earnings before tax (EBITDA) dropped by only 2% in 
the first year of crisis, and then started increasing by 
31% in year two, with revenues being up 7% year-on-
Passengers Revenue (EUR k) Growth (%) EBITDA (EUR k) Growth (%)
2014* 9,155,961 N/P – N/P –
2013* 8,520,880 180300 7% 126200 31%
2012* 8,504,020 168615 –2% 96200 –2%
2011* 8,920,653 171421 98200
Table 1
Key financial metrics – Budapest Airport Zrt. 2011–2014
Source: Budapest Airport (2013), AviAlliance (2014), Budapest Airport (2015). *: 2014 financial results were not published at time of writing.
Table 2
Nine Business Model Building Blocks
Clarifying Business Models: Origins, Present, and Future of the Concept by A. 
Ostenwalder, Y. Pigneur, and C.L. Tucci
Pillar
Business
Model Building 
Block
Description
Product
Value 
Proposition
Gives an overall view of a company’s bundle of 
products and services.
C
us
to
m
er
In
te
rf
ac
e
Target Customer
Describes the segments of customers a company wants 
to offer value to.
Distribution 
Channel
Describes the various means of the company to get in 
touch with its customers.
Relationship
Explains the kind of links a company establishes 
between itself and its different customer segments.
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Value 
Configuration
Describes the arrangement of activities and resources.
Core 
Competency
Outlines the competencies necessary to execute the 
company’s business model.
Partner 
Network
Portrays the network of cooperative agreements with 
other companies necessary to efficiently offer and 
commercialize value.
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
A
sp
ec
ts Cost Structure
Sums up the monetary consequences of the means 
employed in the business model.
Revenue Model
Describes the way a company makes money through a 
variety of revenue flows.
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year. The company’s recovery process was symbolically 
completed after it could report to have served 9.1 million 
customers in 2014, more than even during the best years 
when Malév was still operating (see Appendix I).
The changes will be presented in the structure follow-
ing the nine business model building blocks proposed by 
Ostenwalder, Pigneur and Tucci (2005). Only data related 
to the three-year period between January 2010 and De-
cember 2012 was included. (Table 2)
The value proposition to its customer airlines is to 
offer reliable infrastructure able to handle flights and 
passengers 24 hours/day without constraints, at a lo-
cation where there is demand for air services. New 
value creating services were added, such as low cost 
aircraft parking allowing passengers walking onto the 
aircraft. New infrastructure was built upon request of 
one of the new entrants. New boarding gates offered 
sufficient capacity to handle the boarding process for 
passengers of 12 departing planes. A new pricing struc-
ture was developed, which included high incentives for 
new entrants – which were mainly low cost carriers. 
Also, several services were debundled, allowing the 
airlines to stop paying for services they were not using, 
for example fast track security, passenger bridges and 
passenger bussing. This was only possible by redesign-
ing operational procedures and changing processes in 
cooperation with stakeholders such as local authorities 
and other suppliers.
The organisation targets several B2B segments. The 
first group are airlines operating a ‘hub-and-spoke’ 
system at the airport, such as Malév with its local sub-
contractors. This system allows passengers to fly from 
their origin to Budapest (along the ‘spokes’ of the route 
network), transfer at the airport (the ‘hub’) and con-
tinue to their final destination (along another ‘spoke’). 
This segment is essential to achieve significant growth, 
without this system such passengers would not use the 
airport at all. In the case of Budapest this accounted 
for around 20% of the demand. Further segments are 
foreign airlines, which deliver ‘only’ direct passengers 
as well as attract local passengers to fly to their own 
hubs and beyond. A further segment is low cost car-
riers marketing aggressively to price sensitive tourists 
and business people, followed by charter carriers us-
ing the airport as an element of their packaged holiday 
products. One of the segments was lost completely (the 
national hub-and-spoke airline), while another segment 
– the low cost segment – grew from 22% to 50% in 
market share.
Two teams were in charge of customer contact, one 
focusing on the commercial relationship and a sec-
ond, larger team, delivering the services required at 
the agreed standard. The links to customer firms were 
very close for the hub-and-spoke segment, and less 
close with other segments, which seemed to be more 
driven by market demands rather than service quality, 
and were unwilling to commit to longer term relation-
ships. The relationships with several key strategic cus-
tomers were intensified, including negotiations about 
long-term agreements, starting from the period of cri-
sis. Higher frequency of contact, and increased value 
of information transmitted to potential customers was 
observed.
The activities and resources of the company to de-
liver value were slightly adjusted. For example making 
passenger fast track a pay-for-use service required the 
installation of new passenger lanes and payment ki-
osks. Some procedures needed to be adjusted, such as 
more efficient re-fuelling processes or speedy passport 
checks for stewardesses. After a reduction of adminis-
trative staff, teams had to learn to cope with time pres-
sure and very demanding new customers.
In order to address the issue of an underutilization 
of buildings, the management decided to temporarily 
close one of the two terminal buildings, regardless of 
the numerous services and businesses operating there 
under a lease agreement. The closure led to increased 
efficiency in the remaining building, and even stores 
soon reached the originally forecasted volumes, allow-
ing additional stores to be opened. In 2014 alone, the 
company attracted a supermarket, a telecommunica-
tions shop, a travel electronics and accessories store, a 
Victoria’s Secret branded cosmetics and lingerie store 
and opened a new 190sqm roof top lounge and bar. 
While total retail space has still not reached previous 
levels (see Figure 2), the ratio of passengers to floor 
space is more attractive, leading to increases in produc-
tivity and rental income.
The core competency of the company continued to 
be operating airport infrastructure. Following a path 
chosen well before the crisis, the firm further reduced 
its scope to concentrate on core activities. This in-
volved, for example, outsourcing of all activities related 
to vehicle maintenance, facility management and clean-
ing. Several key services of the value chain are being 
provided by third party entities, a fact that increases 
the ability of the airport to adjust the service offering 
if needed. For example, low cost airlines required addi-
tional services for charging excess baggage, which third 
parties were able to offer in short time under an agree-
ment with both the airport the airlines. The business 
model prior to the crisis included an on-going process 
to outsource non-core activities; therefore this was not 
changed due to the events of 2011.
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While there were no significant changes to the net-
work of partners (such as those servicing and maintain-
ing aircraft or checking-in passengers), it is worth to 
discuss the cost structure and revenue model in greater 
detail. Cost cutting measures lead to the cost budgets 
for 2012 to be reduced by 25%. The company’s links 
to employees representatives (supported by the local 
labour law) allowed a fast reduction of staff by some 
250 people only two months after the event, and a fur-
ther 100 headcounts could be reduced as they were on 
leased contracts. Only in 2009 was the last strike at 
the airport’s company (Index.hu, 2009), but since then 
the new management was able to lead the organisation 
without the threat of strike. Contracts with main sup-
pliers were renegotiated, and infrastructure used by 
the operation and tenants was reduced to increase ef-
ficiency (Linkweiler 2013). At the same time, revenues 
only dipped by 19% reducing the operating profit from 
83k to 79k Euro. Finance costs, however, remained un-
changed.
The above section discusses the most relevant data 
related to the building blocks of the company’s business 
model. While in many cases the magnitude of change 
was drastic, such as cutting investment volume into 
half, it appears that the basic model of doing business 
has not changed significantly. In order to understand 
how the company managed to identify, decide and im-
plement such changes, we need to look into mode data 
about the organisation’s written or unwritten processes 
and approaches how to go about change. In the follow-
ing part, we summarise information on the capabilities 
to exploit existing assets and/or shift assets and organi-
sational structure to manage this crisis.
Information flow to/from top management. The 
CEO encourages a culture of open communication and 
feedback. His office is located at the centre of the ad-
ministrative offices (rather than on top of them), and 
when not in meetings follows an open door policy. 
Employees are invited to participate and ask questions 
during informal ‘breakfasts with the CEO’. Commu-
nication to employees takes place via a staff newspa-
per, as well as internal communications ambassadors 
in each business unit, tasked to disseminate important 
information quickly and informally. This tool is often 
faster than cascading information through management 
layers and avoids rumours spreading.
Smaller, faster decision making units. The CEO 
meets weekly with a small selection of Executive board 
members, to make decisions. This institution was cre-
ated during the crisis but stayed in place afterwards. 
Business controllers were assigned to each business 
unit, as part of that organisation, ensuring that re-
sources are available to prepare decisions and that they 
are in line with financial policies, such as investment 
policies or cash flow targets. CFO received additional 
veto rights over even smaller expenses for a temporary 
period to introduce a culture of rigour and reduce un-
necessary expenses. Some of these rights were retained 
after the crisis.
Organisation following market structure. A new or-
ganisational structure was put in place to allocate busi-
ness units to customer segments. For example the same 
executive director was responsible for the aeronautical 
operations and generating aeronautical revenues, an-
other executive director for building, leasing and op-
erating stores inside the terminal and so on. Once new 
business opportunity was identified which required a 
change to the value delivery, processes could be ad-
justed quickly to meet customers’ requirements. In 
fact, this change took place in 2009 already, at a time 
when first signs of Malév’s difficulties became visible, 
in foresight of what was ahead (Linkweiler 2013).
Close links to shareholders. The company’s major-
ity shareholder is also providing the top management 
of the company, guaranteeing faster decision making 
and a trust based relationship between owners and ex-
ecutives.
High loyalty. Bonus schemes and fringe benefits are 
in place for all administrative staff and a modern HR 
culture ensures development opportunities and open 
performance management. During the crisis period, a 
bonus system was introduced to blue collar workers, 
too, replacing additional pay triggered by certain shift 
patterns. This created loyalty among high performing 
teams and increased awareness of company, team and 
individual performance on all levels of the organisa-
tion. The selection of employees emphasises a wide 
range of backgrounds, for example the airline sales 
team members joined from airfreight, ground handling 
and the airline industry, and thus have a deep under-
standing of their customer needs.
Approach to learning. The management’s approach 
to problem solving allows a time for alternative pro-
posals and open discussion, while respecting decisions 
once final. Mistakes are seen as an opportunity to im-
prove. The responsibilities of executives are changed 
from time to time, which increases an understanding of 
the overall business as well as strengthens the coher-
ence of the team.
Finally, the research shed light on several instances 
where the company is pursuing seemingly conflicting 
strategies. First, the general approach to investment 
was extremely conservative, stopping all non-essen-
tial projects. On the other hand, incumbent custom-
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ers demanded new boarding facilities, which required 
releasing non-planned capital expenditure or drawing 
planned investment from other business units, seem-
ingly a paradox strategy. 
The management developed the capability to iden-
tify and decide on investments related to new business 
opportunities while being very strict on any other in-
vestment at the same time. This involves reviewing 
available capital on a regular basis and can lead to ten-
sions inside the organisation if not managed with care. 
Another paradox strategy followed may be seen in the 
difference between the state of the art architecture of 
the SkyCourt building opened in 2011 and the tin build-
ings placed on the concrete to serve low cost boarding 
gates. Both projects were planned and implemented by 
the very same team, however their design and approach 
to planning and execution could not be more different. 
Third, the pricing strategy discussed above included 
two strategies, which create tension inside and exter-
nally. Typically, airport prices are determined by dis-
tributing the costs of capital investment in infrastruc-
ture among its users, the airlines. With less passengers 
using the infrastructure, the prices overall had to be in-
creased. Some of the existing customers were, in fact, 
enjoying near monopoly benefits after the exit of a ma-
jor competitor, and were able to pass on increased air-
port costs to their customers. On the other hand, the air-
port needed to attract new business quickly, and most 
potential opportunities were among the price sensitive 
low cost airlines. Therefore solutions had to be found 
to be price competitive while at the same time increas-
ing the overall yield per passenger. The sales teams 
were negotiating with low cost airlines about savings of 
several cents per passengers at one moment, and with a 
middle-eastern carrier ordering first class facilities for 
their new daily service at the next.
In the next section, we will analyse and discuss the 
above data in order to answer the research questions in 
turn.
Discussion
Firstly we will identify the dynamic capabilities applied 
in the above case, and discuss how such capabilities 
can positively influence a company’s recovery from a 
significant drop of demand. Next, we will address the 
question of change: Has the underlying business model 
changed, was there a “change model” applied, or is 
even the change part of the business model. Have dy-
namic capabilities changed before or during the crisis 
under discussion. And: Which dynamic capabilities are 
required to sustain strategic paradox over time?
Dynamic capabilities cover the internal abilities of 
the organisation to change the metrics in their busi-
ness model, to integrate, reallocate and reconfigure re-
sources within the company, which have led to superior 
performance. The organisation had such inherent capa-
bilities or took care to develop them to cope with the 
change. The above data contains (at least) four distinct 
capabilities, time-sensitive strategic decision-making, 
flexible resource allocation, release of resources, and 
coevolving of different parts of the firm.
Time-sensitive strategic decision-making. The es-
tablished routine of frequent leadership gatherings, 
the creation of smaller, fully empowered decision 
making teams, and the close relationship between 
management and shareholders has led to an ability 
to make strategic decisions at a fast pace. A regular 
routine to pool the management teams skills and func-
tional backgrounds, discuss within clear time limits 
the options, and make choices which shape the future 
strategic moves has allowed to go from challenge to 
implementation in less time. By involving all crucial 
areas of the business, required changes to existing re-
source pools can be reviewed. This requires a constant 
flow of information to the top, open communication 
channels with middle management, and a capability of 
leaders to absorb and have ready the required informa-
tion for decision-making.
Flexible resource allocation. The ability to recon-
figure existing resources inside the organisation is a 
key capability during periods of change. For example 
when customer requirements need the development of 
infrastructure at short notice, too strict allocation of 
resources slows down reaction time and may lead to 
loss of market share. Seizing business opportunities 
requires the ability to allocate manpower, capital and 
management time to key issues. This requires routines, 
which delay final decisions for resource allocation, and 
maintain a readiness of individual business units to let 
go of initially planned investment, for example, allow-
ing another unit to maximize benefits resulting from a 
change. Part of such routines can be hard coded, for ex-
ample in business plans and approval processes, which 
approve use of resources tied to certain conditions or 
additional approval processes, and close control of 
a central unit. In the case discussed above this was 
through the role of and authority given to business con-
trollers. Many routines however are developed through 
organisational learning and a certain corporate culture, 
which develops over time.
Release of resources. The case discussed high-
lighted the importance of releasing resources to ad-
just to market conditions. Human resource planning 
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routines can consider such situations in advance by 
having a certain portion of the work force on tempo-
rary or agency contracts. Contracts with suppliers can 
include opt-out or early termination clauses in certain 
cases.
Coevolving of different parts of the firm. Knowl-
edge and skills present in different units of the firm 
may lead to superior outcomes when combined, even 
for temporary times. The ability to identify and pool 
capabilities of the entire organisation for specific chal-
lenges at hand ensures that synergies are identified and 
may become a resource in itself. By cooperating, the 
various parts of the company are developing their own 
resources (such as knowledge), and thus evolve, while 
overall the combined abilities achieve better results. In 
the case above, merging operations and commercial 
teams improved the firm’s ability to quickly assess the 
operational needs of potential new customers, develop 
associated products and offer them with appropriate 
profits.
These dynamic capabilities seem especially impor-
tant in dynamic and less predictable industries. The 
flexible allocation of resources, the ability to lose (or 
gain) resources quickly, and an ability to exploit op-
portunities through synergies while allowing the firms 
units to coevolve have allowed to quickly ‘weather the 
storm’ of an external demand shock in the case dis-
cussed. The routines discussed are rather simple, re-
quire little description and can be communicated even 
verbally over a wide area of the firm.
Fewer rules make it easier for managers to focus 
their attention during turbulence and overwhelming 
amounts of data (Eisenhardt – Martin, 2000), and they 
are less likely to be forgotten over time (Argote, 1999). 
It should also be noted that actual and perceived cri-
ses may, in fact, be a blessing in disguise if they have 
brought forward and implemented additional dynamic 
capabilities in the organization. This importance of cri-
ses has been confirmed in a long-term study of learning 
processes in Hyundai (Kim, 1998).
Also, such capabilities are most needed during 
change, therefore too complex sets of rules require 
frequent adjustment, which in turn does not allow the 
routines to deeply penetrate management thinking. In 
fact, such capabilities demand that the firm engages 
in experimenting and learning, and further develop its 
abilities. A certain part of them are hard coded, others 
are manifested in the day-to-day behaviour of man-
agement, routine of decision-making processes and 
informal approaches to resource allocation. Dynamic 
capabilities that have been developed during a period 
of high dynamism may be under threat, once the in-
dustry gets less dynamic again (Eisenhardt – Martin, 
2000).
Was the underlying business model changed? Dur-
ing the period described in the data, the company 
underwent significant change, and there is no doubt 
that some fundamental changes too place. A drastic 
reduction of costs, a closing of production facilities, 
a loss of a complete customer segment has fundamen-
tally affected the way of doing business. However one 
may argue that the fundamental business model was 
hardly touched. The company’s value proposition is 
still to offer infrastructure and services at a high qual-
ity level, access to an attractive market, and pricing 
concepts to allow B2B customers a profitable opera-
tion, for example. The metrics have changed, and the 
allocation of resources among activities, but neither 
have entirely new business activities been started, not 
has the company reorganised their value chain. It ap-
pears that the model in place was robust, still complex 
enough to allow fast reaction to changes in the mar-
ket place, and only success metrics shifted sideways 
(McGrath, 2010).
The model is complex in the sense that it is exter-
nally aware and able to develop. Such a firm is on the 
lookout for new ideas and technologies, has relation-
ships with outsiders in place to help satisfy such needs, 
and has frequent exchanges with suppliers and custom-
ers to plan their activities in concert with the activi-
ties (see Type 4 models as proclaimed by (Chesbrough, 
2007).
Was then the ability to react built into the model? 
In the sense of Linder and Cantrell (2000), this com-
pany did neither change the underlying operating 
mode, nor actively seek the development. It was a 
reactive change, which was expected but not planned 
(Linkweiler, 2013). Therefore it is unlikely that there 
was a specific ‘change model’. Consequently, it can 
be argued that the abilities to maximize the opportuni-
ties given by an unforeseen change in demand are not 
founded in the business model itself, but the dynamic 
capabilities inherent in the organisation. This is more 
likely to be the case in industries which otherwise are 
undergoing less change, including capital intensive in-
dustries, and those relying less on innovation and tech-
nology change, for example.
Several dynamic capabilities seem to have been de-
veloped during the crisis itself. For example the speed 
of strategic decision-making was increased when the 
leadership realised that the existing processes were too 
slow to cope with the volume and urgency of making 
necessary choices. However most other capabilities 
were in place before the external crisis. In fact, the fast 
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recovery was most likely driven by the fact that the 
organisation already owned the necessary tools. This 
underlines the importance for companies to shape up 
the existing processes and routines in anticipation of 
change.
Several of the strategic choices made contained in-
herent conflict, and such paradoxical strategies require 
additional abilities of the organisation.  There may be 
contradictions between several paths taken, and one ap-
proach may, in fact, be threatening the other. For exam-
ple while exploring new opportunities, aiming at new 
customer segments and developing future products re-
quires risk taking and fast decision making, exploiting 
existing products roots in risk minimization and hier-
archical structures (Smith et al., 2010). The company 
discussed in this article chose to maintain central and 
hierarchical structures but at the same time focused on 
fast decision-making and a speedy flow of manage-
ment information to retain the ability to change course 
if needed. Another risk of paradoxical strategies may 
be people being unable to cope with applying differ-
ent set of rules to very similar issues, such focusing 
on standard service delivery for existing clients while 
developing new services and thinking out of the box 
for new ones.
One model that was proposed to manage this ten-
sion is the learning organisation. It understands the 
need to change and adapt while at the same time per-
form and align to well working practices (Smith et al., 
2010). In the present case, the company discussed here 
combined a leader-centric, hierarchical approach to 
decision-making, while encouraging open communica-
tion. Having all information available to the leadership 
team requires both a regular flow of management in-
formation but also the readiness of middle and senior 
management to openly communicate both positive and 
negative things to the top. Furthermore, the organisa-
tion must ensure a high flexibility of resource alloca-
tion or – if needed – withdrawal. This was achieved 
through teamwork and good understanding of each 
other’s challenges.
In fact, internal debates and tensions may be the 
key ingredient to innovation and change in industries 
undergoing change, and appropriate management pro-
cesses and structures in place may become a competi-
tive advantage over other players. Examples of such 
organisations include Southwest Airlines, which man-
aged to uphold a business model for decades that de-
livered strict cost management and exploiting existing 
businesses while also encouraging challenging the sta-
tus quo and explore new business opportunities (Git-
tell, 2000).
Conclusion
Companies experiencing an unusual degree of change 
may find that their organisation’s capabilities are unfit 
to cope with the challenges and opportunities at hand. 
By capabilities we refer to the capacity of an organi-
zation to purposefully create, extend, or modify its re-
source base (Helfat et al., 2007: p. 4.). This includes 
routines, rules, behaviours, structures hard or soft 
coded into the organisation of a firm. Today’s business 
leaders must constantly review and develop their or-
ganizations capabilities, value creation processes, mar-
ket strategies, relationship networks and so on.
In the case described in this article, a firm’s leader-
ship team has developed the organisation’s ability to 
adopt to and, in the long term, benefit from external 
changes brought about when their largest customer 
went out of business. Such dynamic capabilities enable 
firms to exploit business, technological and market op-
portunities and adapt to market changes (Teece et al., 
1997; Teece, 2010).
While changing a large number of success metrics 
and reallocating resources within the value change 
significantly, no major change of the underlying busi-
ness model could be identified. The analysis therefore 
focused on identifying the capabilities present in the 
organisation. There were four distinct routines, namely 
structures and practices enduring time-sensitive strate-
gic decision-making by the leadership, a flexible allo-
cation of capital and manpower resources, the ability 
to release resources no short notice, and a culture and 
processes which encouraging learning and coevolving 
of different parts of the firm.
At the same time, the leadership made a number of 
seemingly contradictory strategic choices, termed stra-
tegic paradox, which may cause tensions and destruc-
tive processes inside the firm (Ford – Backoff, 1988; 
Lewis, 2000). These have been avoided by developing 
dynamic capabilities (e.g., fast flow of information) al-
lowing managing these effectively. In fact, the crisis 
itself may have developed capabilities, which resulted 
in competitive advantages in the long-term.
The findings expand our knowledge of dynamic ca-
pabilities, following calls for more research into their 
role in traditional, less dynamic industries (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2009; Kor – Mesko, 2013). We put for-
ward the view that the ability of companies to react to 
and benefit from sudden change does not always re-
quire changing business models, but a limited number 
of specific routines and processes. We argue that there 
are some capabilities, which leaders can develop with-
out the need to change business models, and illustrate 
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such capabilities based on data collected. Furthermore, 
there are also complex business models, which encour-
age the development and application of such capabili-
ties. These include inherent conflicts, paradoxes, and 
therefore encourage an organisation to live with, man-
age and benefit from a constant tension to justify one 
against the other, compare, chose.
There are a number of limitations of our analysis. 
Firstly, the case study approach itself does not permit 
to generalise findings or even suggest its applicability 
to other industries. This study aims to further the dis-
cussion by additional insights and also provides some 
data that may be of value for future studies. Secondly, 
the data was collected after the crisis, and is based on 
post event management interviews. Pre-crisis data was 
available only through press releases and company 
documents.
There are some managerial implications of this 
study. Firms in industries with limited dynamics may 
be well advised to ensure the relevant dynamic capa-
bilities are in place to be prepared in case of unprece-
dented change. In fact, the benefits of a crisis may lie in 
the ability to develop an ability to innovate and rethink 
the resource allocation. Also, when faced with the need 
to exploit existing markets while exploring new oppor-
tunities, which may lead to seem-
ingly paradox strategic choices, 
the organisation needs to be able 
to handle the related tensions. Ap-
propriate communication channels 
and learning mechanisms need to 
be in place to allow an organisa-
tional stability that can maintain 
such pressures over time.
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